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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers only the property law aspects of trusts and suc-
cession. The reader is cautioned at the outset that there is a vast body
of tax law in this area which usually does not appear in state court cases,
but does appear on the federal level. The practitioner of today must con-
sider tax law in conjunction with the property law before taking any
action. However, the tax aspects are too vast to be included here.
II. LEGISLATION
Between the Special Session of the legislature in December 1969
and the Second Special Session in June 1971, the Florida Legislature
* The decisions surveyed in this article appear in volumes 224 through 252 of the South-
ern Reporter, Second Series. All Florida legislation from the special session in December 1969
through the second special session in June 1971 is included, as are the 1971 amendments to
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
** Former Research and Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
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enacted a massive amount of legislation dealing with trusts and succes-
sion. However, only major legislative changes or additions will be
covered in detail. Changes relating to the salaries of various county
judges,' changes in chapter 253 of the Florida Statutes regarding the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund,2 and various other changes3 will not
be covered as they add nothing to the substantive law covered by this
survey and are only mechanical in nature and application.
Florida Laws 1970, chapter 70-295 makes a significant addition to
the Savings Association Act4 authorizing building and loan associations
and savings and loan associations to maintain and lease safe deposit
facilties. 5 Formerly, these facilities were available only at commercial
banks.' While the new act seems to track the existing rights and responsi-
bilities of lessors and lessees,' the institutions are different, and, therefore,
the appropriate sections should be checked carefully by the practitioner.
The disposition of proceeds of life insurance has been substantially
affected by Florida Laws 1970, chapter 70-376, which effected a major
rewording of section 222.13 of the Florida Statutes (1969). Previously,
under section 222.13, the death of the named beneficiary before the in-
sured's death resulted in the policy being payable to the insured's estate,
unless the policy provided otherwise. Under Florida Laws 1970 chapter
70-376, no such provision was included. Now, a determination must be
made as to whether the beneficiary had a vested or contingent interest in
the proceeds. In addition, the effect of the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Law' will have to be considered. Generally though, the new law provides
that life insurance proceeds will go to the designated beneficiary ex-
clusively and will be exempt from the claims of creditors, unless the
policy or a valid assignment declares otherwise.9 However, when the in-
surance proceeds by designation or otherwise are payable to the estate
of the insured, they are estate assets for purposes of probate as well as
taxes.' 0
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 44.09, 44.12 (Supp. 1970); Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-48, amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 44 (1969) (dealing with county judges, salaries and budgets).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 253.02, 253.05, 253.12, 253.122-.124, 253.1281, 253.151, 253.62 (Supp.
1970) ; Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-286.
3. FLA. STAT. 40.38 (Supp. 1970) (dealing with the drawing of jurors); FLA. STAT.
§ 28.231 (Supp. 1970) (massive restructuring of fees and commissions) ; Fla. Laws 1971, ch.
71-114 (setting up special contingency trust fund for state for excessive fees collected prior
to effective date revising fees).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 665 (1969). Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-295, added FLA. STAT. §§ 665.55-.64
(Supp. 1970). The reader should note that the codification numbers of the added statutes in
the 1970 Florida Session Laws do not correspond with the numeration which appears in the
1970 Supplement to Florida Statutes, 1969 (Unofficial). The latter numeration is used herein.
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.55-.64 (Supp. 1970). Note that these are the corrected statutory
section numbers. See note 4 supra.
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 659.43-.51 (1969).
7. Compare note 5 supra with note 6 supra.
8. FLA. STAT. § 736.05 (1969). See also 18A FLA. JUR. Insurance §§ 897-900 (1971).
9. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-376, amending FLA. STAT. § 222.13(1) (1969).
10. Id.
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A new chapter 409 of the 1970 Supplement to the Florida Statutes,
1969, has been created by Florida Laws 1970, chapter 70-255, setting up
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to replace the
State Department and State Board of Social Services. Florida Statutes
section 409.315 (Supp. 1970) deals with the payments of accrued public
assistance benefits to the deceased's beneficiaries, and section 409.345 of
the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1970) deals with the priority and right of
the state to make a claim against the decedent's estate."
Florida Laws 1970, chapter 70-54, section 1, reenacted section
736.17 of the Florida Statutes (1967) regarding bequests and devises to
a trustee. This reenactment was necessary because Florida Laws 1969,
chapter 69-88, which enacted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act may
have been interpreted to repeal that section. Florida Laws 1970, chapter
70-54, makes it clear that this was not the legislative intent and further
states:
Insofar as Chapter 69-88 may appear to repeal Section 736.17,
Florida Statutes 1967, it is acknowledged that Chapter 69-88 did
not conform to the requirements of Section 6, Article III, of the
constitution of the State of Florida and is void. 2
In addition, if any repeal is later found, then this reenactment is retro-
active to the effective date of Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-88."3
In 1971, section 736.17 of the Florida Statutes (1969) received an
additional subsection providing that bequests and devises to a trustee
shall not be invalid because of any of the provisions of section 689.075
of the Florida Statutes (1969).' 4
Florida Laws 1970, chapter 70-4, dramatically revised the rights of
married women with respect to their property.15 They may now sepa-
rately relinquish or alter their dower rights.'
The powers of trustees were enlarged under Florida Laws 1970, chap-
ter 70-425, which amended section 691.03(7) of the Florida Statutes
(1969). Now a trustee has the power to exchange capital stock of any
bank or holding company for capital stock in any registered bank holding
company subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956.1
11. FLA. STAT. § 409.315, 409.345 (Supp. 1970). Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-255, incorrectly
numbered these sections 409.316 and 409.346 respectively.
12. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-54, § 3.
13. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-54, § 2.
14. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-34, adding FLA. STAT. § 736.17(2)(e). FLA. STAT. § 689.075
(1969) deals with the validity of an inter vivos trust. Despite the retention of certain
enumerated powers in the trustee, the statute makes it clear that it is not a testamentary
disposition.
15. Amending FLA. STAT. §§ 694.04, 708.08-.09 (1969); repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 62.021,
693.01-.05, 693.13-14, 708.01-.04, 708.06-.07 (1969). This was necessary as a result of FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 5 (1968) which abolished the distinction between the property rights of
married men and women.
16. FLA. STAT. 9 708.08, 708.09 (Supp. 1970).
17. 12 U.S.C. 9 1841-49 (1970).
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The responsibilities of banks and trust companies under the Banking
Code for reporting,' assessments, 0 and allowable investments ° have
been changed significantly and should be carefully consulted by the prac-
titioner.
Florida charities were immensely benefited when the Charitable
Trust Act of 1971 was enacted.2' The act affects existing and future pri-
vate foundation trusts and split interest trusts2 2 and provides that a
trustee may elect to come under the act if eligible. 23 Furthermore, it ex-
presses "the intent of the state of Florida to preserve, foster and en-
courage gifts to or for the benefit of charitable organizations."'24 The act
will bestow many tax benefits on the trust along with responsibilities
and duties upon the trustee. The practitioner is urged to consult the act
in detail for all far-reaching ramifications and cross-references to the
Internal Revenue Code. The effective date of the act is Novmber 1,
1971.25
Death benefits of any kind, not just limited to those from insurance
policies or employee's trusts, may be made payable during life or by will
to a trustee for a revocable or an irrevocable trust. Furthermore, "[i]t
shall not be necessary to the validity of any such trust agreement, or
declaration of trust, whether revocable or irrevocable, that it have a
trust corpus other than the right of the trustee to receive such death bene-
fits."26 The insurer will pay the proceeds to the executor or administrator
if no trustee claims within one year.27 If the proceeds are paid to a
trustee, they "shall not be deemed to be part of the estate of the testator
or intestate estate.) 28
A custodian under the Florida Gifts to Minors Act can now resign
or appoint a successor custodian, without the necessity of a court pro-
ceeding. All that is now required is a written instrument executed before
a subscribing witness other than the custodian. 9 In addition, if the
custodian dies without naming a successor, and the minor is over four-
teen-years-old and has no guardian, then the minor himself may designate
a successor custodian by means of a written instrument executed before
a subscribing witness other than the successor.
18. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-407, adding FLA. STAT. § 658.07(1) (Supp. 1970).
19. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-263, amending FLA. STAT. § 658.08 (1969).
20. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-167, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.20(5) (c) (Supp. 1970) (in-
creasing allowable investments in incorporated companies from two to five percent of the
unimpaired capital and surplus). See generally Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-411, amending FLA.
STAT. § 659.20 (Supp. 1970).
21. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-256.
22. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-256, § 2.
23. Id. § 10.
24. Id. § 12.
25. Id. § 15.
26. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-248, § (1) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 1(3).
28. Id. § 1(4)
29. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-23, amending FLA. STAT. § 710.08 (1969).
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Section 736.25(2) of the Florida Statutes (1969), dealing with the
manner of executing anatomical gifts under the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, 0 has been amended by Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-201. It now
requires that the document making the gift be signed by the donor and
two witnesses all of whom must sign in the presence of each other. Pre-
viously, this was required only if the donor could not sign himself. Addi-
tionally, the form for the Uniform Donor Card was added by the new
section. 81
Various changes in the procedures for the taxation of a decedent's
estate were made by Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-202. The sections
of the Florida Statutes that have been amended and the resulting changes
are as follows: (1) section 198.02 of the Florida Statutes (1969) now
provides that the Florida estate tax on resident decedents' estates shall
not be less than the pro rata credit amount under the federal revenue
act; (2) sections 198.13 and 198.15 of the Florida Statutes (1969) have
been amended to change the fifteen month filing and tax due period to
nine months; (3) section 198.32 of the Florida Statutes (1969) has been
changed to increase the certificate of nonliability fee from one to five
dollars; and (4) section 198.12 of the Florida Statutes (1969) no longer
requires filing of a copy of the federal preliminary notice to comply with
the state notice requirements within two months of the decedent's death.
Section 689.075 of the Florida Statutes (1969) deals with the va-
lidity of otherwise valid inter vivos trusts where certain powers are re-
tained by the settlor. Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-126, has attempted
to clarify the execution aspects and the effect of this section on Totten
type bank accounts. Section 689.075(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes
(1969) has been amended to provide that an inter vivos trust will not
be regarded as an attempted testamentary disposition, nor will it be in-
validated when the settlor is sole trustee if "at the time the trust instru-
ment is executed it is either valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the formalities
for the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction.18 2 Additionally,
section 689.075(2) of the Florida Statutes (1969) was amended to make
it clear that nothing contained in the statute would effect the validity
of bank accounts where one person holds them in trust for another and
where the arrangement is revocable by the settlor, that is, Totten type ar-
rangements. 3
Under Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-205, a new provision, section
659.291 of the Florida Statutes relating to the Banking Code, has been
added. This section creates a presumption that the deposits vest in the
survivors where there are bank deposits in two or more names, and one
of the parties dies. This presumption "may be overcome only by proof of
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.20, 736.22, 736.24-.28, 736.30 (1969).
31. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-201, amending FLA. STAT. § 736.25(2) (1969).
32. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-126, § 1.
33. Id. § 2.
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fraud, undue influence, or clear and convincing proof of a contrary in-
tent." 4
Section 660.10(3) of the Florida Statutes (1969) relating to the
trust powers and duties of out-of-state corporations was amended to
allow the receipt of devises of real property located in Florida rather
than only bequests of money or intangible personal property. In addition,
an out-of-state corporation, which is authorized to act as trustee under
the laws of the place where it has its principal place of business, can
sell, transfer, and convey real property.5
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-24, has changed the defiinition of a
small estate under section 735.01 of the Florida Statutes (1969) to be
one having a gross value of less than $10,000 exclusive of exempt prop-
erty rather than the previous $3,000 limit. Additionally, section 735.04
(2) of the Florida Statutes (1969) has been amended to allow a county
judge to dispense with the administration of testate or intestate estates
having an aggregate value of less than $10,000 exclusive of exempt prop-
erty rather than the previous $5,000 limit.
The rights and procedures for disclaiming property in Florida have
been spelled out in two new sections to the Florida Statutes. Section
689.21 of the Florida Statutes, added by Florida Laws 1971, chapter
71-31, deals with nontestamentary disclaimers, and section 731.37 of
the Florida Statutes, added by Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-33, deals
with disclaimers from decedents' estates. These two acts are too extensive
to be covered in this survey, but must be consulted by the practitioner
due to their obvious impact on the property law aspects of trusts and
estates in addition to their tax implications. Interestingly enough, both
acts require that disclaimer be made within twelve months after the
creation or ascertainment of the interest. The right to disclaim is barred
if the disclaimant is insolvent at the time of the event which gave rise to
the right to disclaim, or if the property was judicially sold prior to the
filing of disclaimer. The right to disclaim exists regardless of any implied
spendthrift provision or similar restriction. Finally, if a wife consents
to the disclaimer, she is automatically barred from dower.
The non-claim statute8" received an additional exemption under
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-32, with the addition of section 733.16
(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes. This additional exemption gives to any
person who has paid the debt or funeral expenses of the decedent the
rights the payee would have had to claim under this statute against the
estate. Furthermore, if this third person happens to be the personal repre-
sentative and files a written statement, he also can assert a claim against
the estate as of the date of filing. In the event he so files, his interest will
34. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-205, adding FLA. STAT. § 659.291(2).
35. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-55.
36. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1) (1969), known as the non-claim statute, generally requires the
filing of all claims against the estate within six months after the first publication of notice
to creditors.
TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
not be deemed adverse 7 unless an objection to the payment has been
duly filed.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-25, has placed another requirement
on a widow's right to claim dower in real property conveyed by her hus-
band prior to his death. Due to the addition of section 731.35(4) of the
Florida Statutes, a widow is now required to file an instrument with the
clerk of the circuit court for the county in which any real property is lo-
cated, sufficient to give constructive notice that she has elected or may
elect to take dower within three years of her husband's death. It is im-
portant to note that this subsection does not extend the time to elect
dower, 8 nor does it affect any other requirements relating to electing or
assigning dower.
Dower has also been severely affected when a partnership, whether
general or limited, acquires real property in the partnership name. Now,
under Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-71, as to general partnerships and
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-9, as to limited partnerships, "[i]nchoate
dower shall not exist in any interest in partnership real property and
spouses of either limited or general partners who execute conveyances,
encumbrances or other instruments affecting title to its real property
need not join in the conveyance, encumbrance or instrument."39
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-147, removed the disability of nonage
for both male and female minors who are married, divorced, widowed,
etc., and leaves minors free to manage their own estate.
Service of a writ of garnishment on one specified in the writ as
being in a fiduciary or representative capacity shall make him liable just
as any other garnishee under Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-69, which
adds section 77.06(4) of the Florida Statutes.
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-20, provided for the special election
held on November 2, 1971, which amended section 5 of article VII of
the Florida Constitution (1968) "limiting the prohibition against estate,
inheritance and income taxes to natural persons only."40
The state Department of Insurance may now require at its discretion
and for good cause that both domestic and foreign insurers deposit in
trust eligible securities,41 in an amount not less than $75,000 nor more
than $250,000, in addition to other deposits required under the Insurance
Code as a result of Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-89, amending section
624.0210(3) of the Florida Statutes (1969).42
37. FLA. STAT. § 732.55 (1969) requires the appointment of an administrator ad litem
when the personal representative has an adverse claim to the estate.
38. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(1) (1969) generally requires this election to be made within nine
months after the first publication of notice to creditors.
39. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-9, § 2, adding FLA. STAT. 620.081(3) (for limited partner-
ships). See also Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-71, § 3 (for general partnerships).
40. (Emphasis added). This legislation was overwhelmingly passed by the voters, thus
paving the way for a corporate income tax.
41. FLA. STAT. § 625.0202 (1969) defines eligible securities.
42. FLA. STAT. § 624.0210(3) (1969) only covered companies writing property, casualty,
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Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-29, repealed numerous specified gen-
eral laws of local application to strengthen home rule government of
municipalities. However, it specifically exempted any trust agreements in
effect under the enumerated repealed laws.43
Florida Laws 1971, chapter 71-127, amending section 617.50(10) of
the Florida Statutes (1969), now allows trust banks for scholarship plans
to be any state or federally approved bank whose deposits are insured by
an agency similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Pre-
viously, these banks could be located only in Florida."
III. TRUSTS
A. Express Inter Vivos and Testamentary Trusts
In the case of In re Estate of Herron," the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, upheld the creation of an inter vivos trust which at the
time of its creation contained only a life insurance policy.46 The policy
was delivered and payable to the trustee, and the benefits were to be paid
to the wife of the settlor in lieu of dower. In addition, the settlor created
a pour-over will into the inter vivos trust. The Fourth District, in up-
holding the inter vivos trust, also held that the proceeds of the life in-
surance polices were not subject to dower since the trust instrument
indicated a clear intent to create an inter vivos trust, and since the trust
had substantial existence during the testator's life and was not testa-
mentary. Interestingly enough, the settlor had retained all privileges
under the policies, including the power to revoke or amend, and had
relinquished only the right to change the method of payment to the
trustee. The trustee's sole duty during the settlor's lifetime was to main-
tain custody of the instrument and to wait for the settlor's death. After
the settlor's death, the widow unsuccessfully attacked the trust as being
illusory because of the broad powers retained by the settlor. Judge Reed
rejected this argument based on Hanson v. Denckla4 7 and in some far-
reaching dicta stated:
Furthermore, we do not believe the Hanson case is control-
ling today. The public policy of this state as expressed by Ch. 69-
192, Laws of Florida, 1969, [Florida Statute section 689.075]
is not to invalidate an otherwise proper inter vivos trust merely
because the settlor of the trust has retained substantial powers
over the trust res as well as the trustee. This statute does not
apply to the present trust, but in our opinion it is declaratory
surety, or title insurance. Now, all insurance companies come under this statute as a result
of the change.
43. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-29, § 4.
44. FLA. STAT. § 617.50(10) (1969).
45. 237 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
46. See note 26 supra and the related textual discussion.
47. 100 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1956) (trust held illusory due to day-to-day control retained
by settlor).
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of the law existent at the time the trust instrument was ex-
ecuted. 8
The fact that the major benefits in a life insurance policy occur at death
was not enough to make the trust testamentary.49
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that under sec-
tion 731.21 of the Florida Statutes (1969) 50 the named beneficiaries
of an express testamentary trust were entitled to payments upon the
death of the testator and did not have to wait until the bank qualified
as trustee two years later to receive payments. 1 The funding of the
trust was held not always to be essential to the accrual of the right to
payments under a trust, where the corpus of the trust could be used for
payments to beneficiaries even though the primary purpose of the trust
was to provide income for the remaining lives of the beneficiaries. 2
In a per curiam affirmance, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, in the case of In re Estate of Strohm,5 upheld a lower court
order which directed payment of all federal estate taxes including those
attaching to the assets of an inter vivos trust out of the residuary
estate of the will, even though the trust had been amended prior to
the execution of the will to provide for such tax payments out of the
principal of the trust. The results of this case revolve around the ap-
plication of section 734.041(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1969). The
dissenting opinion of Judge McCain, in which the argument that the
later will superseded the trust amendment provision was attacked, is
well worth reading.54
B. Totten Trusts
In Litsey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,5 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, reaffirmed the adoption in Florida
of the Totten Trust doctrine5" as originally adopted in Seymour v.
48. In re Estate of Herron, 237 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See also notes 32
and 33 supra and the related textual discussion for the latest legislative changes to FLA. STAT.
§ 689.075 (1969); note 14 supra for a discussion of this statute; and note 60 infra for almost
identical language to the quoted material regarding Totten Trusts.
49. In re Estate of Herron, 237 So.2d 563, 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
50. The death of the testator is the event which vests the right to legacies or devises
unless the testator in his will has provided that some other event must happen before
a legacy or devise shall vest.
FLA. STAT. § 731.21 (1969).
51. In re Trust of Bowen, 240 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
52. Id. at 320.
53. 241 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
54. FLa. STAT. § 734.041(1)(c) (1969) provides for the apportionment of estate taxes
and payment by the inter vivos trust and not apportionment among the temporary and
remainder estates unless otherwise directed in the trust instrument.
55. 243 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Litsey].
56. A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime
of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such
as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies
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Seymour.57 In Litsey, the executor attempted to overturn thirteen Tot-
ten Trust bank accounts which distributed proceeds (approximately
$160,000) to distant relatives rather than to the testator's children.
The executor argued that the Totten Trust doctrine should be over-
ruled or receded from as it was contrary to the Statute of Wills,58 the
Florida policy of using joint accounts for testamentary purposes, and
the policy against illusory or naked trusts as expressed in Hanson v.
Denckla.5 9 Chief Judge Pierce of the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, completely rejected the executor's argument and based his de-
cision on section 689.075 of the Florida Statutes (1969).6o
C. Purchase Money Resulting Trusts
In a divorce action, if the wife can prove she was the sole con-
tributor to the purchase of property held by both spouses as tenants
by the entirety, the husband will be deemed to hold that property as
trustee in a resulting trust in favor of the wife." There is no presump-
tion of a gift from the wife to the husband; "on the contrary, the pre-
sumption arises that the husband is the trustee of a resulting trust with
the wife as beneficiary thereof or that a special equity exists in her
favor .... "62
The mere fact that a father put up the purchase money for certain
real estate purchased in his daughter's name and that at a subsequent
sale there was an alleged oral agreement to divide the proceeds between
father and daughter, was held to be insufficient evidence to justify the
imposition of a resulting trust in favor of the father.6"
D. Constructive Trusts
In Mudarri v. Gillespie, 4 the Supreme Court of Florida ordered
the imposition of a constructive trust upon the heirs of an estate under
the authority of section 735.11(1) of the Florida Statutes (1969). This
statute allows a creditor or claimant to have a constructive trust im-
before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of
disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the
balance on hand at the death of the depositor.
Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125-126, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
57. 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956).
58. FLA. STAT. § 731.07 (1969).
59. 100 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1956). See note 47 supra.
60. While not applicable to the present trusts, F.S. § 689.075(2) F.S.A. specifically
excludes trust accounts, such as the ones involved here, from having to be in
conformity with the formalities for the execution of wills. Thus the Totten Trust
doctrine is a firmly established rule of law in Florida.
Litsey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 243 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (emphasis
added). This language is similar to that used by Judge Reed in In Re Estate of Herron,
237 So.2d 563, 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
61. Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
62. Id. at 214.
63. Goldberg v. Michalik, 237 So.2d 298, 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
64. 226 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1969), conformed to in 228 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) [here-
inafter cited as Mudarri].
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pressed upon any estate within three years of the death of the decedent
or six months from first publication of an order of administration un-
necessary. In Mudarri, the plaintiffs had been injured in an automobile
accident with the decedent two years prior to his death. In order to
receive an order for administration unnecessary under section 735.04(2)
of the Florida Statutes (1967), the heirs did not inform the judge
of the existence of a $20,000 automobile insurance policy. Since an
automobile liability insurance policy is an asset of the estate,66 the Su-
preme Court of Florida felt that these circumstances required the equi-
table remedy afforded under section 735.11(1) of the Florida Statutes
(1967) since "[a] constructive trust is a remedial device designed to
prevent fraud or unjust enrichment." 7
Constructive service of process is all that is necessary when one is
trying to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of an estate. 8
E. Powers and Duties of the Trustee
"The duties, powers and liabilities of executors and trustees are
ordinarily fixed by the terms of the will and the trust agreement."6 9
Barker v. The Board of Education of the Florida Annual Confer-
ence of the Methodist Church70 illustrates how broad a trustee's power
can be. In Barker, the trustees' action in closing down Georgia Seagle
Hall in Gainesville, Florida, was upheld against an attack by the al-
leged trust beneficiaries as the best economic alternative until a study
was undertaken to determine the best interests of the charitable testa-
mentary trust. Though the court upheld the trustees action and refused
to issue a temporary injunction, it did indicate that the beneficiaries
did possess a sufficient interest to maintain the suit and that there had
been no adjudication as to any construction of the trust document.'
Rule 1.210(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allows trust-
ees to represent beneficiaries in actions in which title to the property
65. As discussed previously under the legislation section of this survey, newly-enacted
FLA. STAT. § 735.04(2) [added by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-24] allows a county judge to
dispense with the administration of an estate having an aggregate value of less than $10,000
exclusive of exempt property. This figure was changed from its previous limit of $5,000.
66. In re Estate of Klipple, 101 So.2d 924 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
67. Mudarri v. Gillespie, 226 So.2d 808, 813 (Fla. 1969).
68. Freedman v. Freedman, 226 So.2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
69. Jones v. First Nat'l Bank, 226 So.2d 834, 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), wherein the court
dismissed a suit brought against executors and trustees for failure of the plaintiffs to attach
copies of agreements to the appellate record and, thus, failed to establish an adequate
record.
70. 245 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Barker].
71. Id. at 669 (dictum). It should be noted that the court was upholding the denial of
a temporary restraining order. "[P]laintifls have failed to demonstrate such an interest as
would entitle them to injunctive interference for the present and that the action on the part
of the trustees does not presently warrant injunctive interference . . . ." Id. However, in light
of the court's indication that the plaintiffs did have a sufficient interest to maintain the
suit, this court could well take a different view of a suit for a permanent injunction or
another allied claim.
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is vested in the trustees. However, where the trustee asks the beneficiary
to provide counsel to defend the trustee and instead the beneficiary
defends himself individually, the courts will allow the beneficiary to
appear and defend if the trustee fails to do so.72 This was the case
in Cowen v. Knott," where the bank, as trustee of a land trust, asked
the beneficiaries to bring in counsel to defend them in a mortgage fore-
closure action, and the beneficiaries filed defensive answers individually.
Section 689.071 of the Florida Statutes (1969) validates the Land
Trust doctrine in Florida and allows a trustee to hold bare legal title
for the beneficial owner. In Ferraro v. Parker,74 the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, upheld the interest of the beneficiary as per-
sonalty and not realty under the authority of section 689.071(4) of the
Florida Statutes (1969)" 5 since the trust agreement in question so pro-
vided. Thus, the beneficiary's pledge of that interest was not held to
be a mortgage on realty. In dicta, Judge Pierce stated in Ferraro that
the land trust is clearly an active rather than a mere passive trust.76
The Second District again dealt with a land trust in Cowen v.
Knott.77 In Cowen, the court held that the beneficiaries may become
active when the trustee in a land trust refuses to do so.
Lest it be thought that a land trust is the only type of a trust
where the trustee's power can be severely limited without invalidating
the trust, the case of In re Estate of Herron" should be considered.
In that case, the subject of the trust was a life insurance policy, and
even though the trustee's sole duty was to maintain custody of the policy
during the settlor's lifetime, the court did not consider the trust to be
an illusory one since there was a clear intent to establish a trust on
the part of the settlor. In addition, the court saw an implied duty of the
trustee to hold himself in readiness for the performance of more active
duties after the settlor's death.
F. Charitable Testamentary Trusts
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, applied a limitation
on the use of the cy pres doctrine79 in Jewish Guild for the Blind v.
72. Cowen v. Knott, 252 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
73. Id.
74. 229 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Ferraro].
75. In all cases where said recorded instrument, as hereinabove provided, contains
a provision defining and declaring the interests of beneficiaries thereunder to be
personal property only, such provision shall be controlling for all purposes where
such determination shall become an issue under the laws or in the courts of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 689.071(4) (1969).
76. Judge Pierce cited as his authority, McKillop, The Illinois Land Trust in Florida, 13
U. FiA. L. REv. 173 (1960). Ferraro v. Parker, 229 So.2d 621, 624 (Fla. Dist. 1969). This
author knows of no case in Florida to date which actually holds the duties of the trustee in a
land trust to be active.
77. 252 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Cowen]. See note 72 supra
and the related textual discussion.
78. 237 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See note 45 supra and the related textual
discussion.
79. In charitable trusts, if it is impossible, illegal, or impractical to carry out the specific
terms of the trust as stated by the settlor, and he has stated a general charitable purpose, the
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First National Bank. 0 In that case, the testator had left a testamentary
trust which left funds for the construction of a new building for a cer-
tain charitable organization, but had not left sufficient funds for a com-
plete building. Under the terms of the trust, it was also provided that
the funds were to be given to a second charity if not used for the original
stated purpose. Since the funds were insufficient to build a separate
building, the first charitable organization wanted to simply add an ad-
ditional floor to its existing building, and the second charitable orga-
nization agreed to go along with the desires of the first. Despite this
agreement, Judge McNulty, speaking for the majority, stated:
We only hold that when the dominant intention of the settlor
of a trust can be substantially complied with by the alternatives
expressly set forth in the trust, the cy pres doctrine is not neces-
sary to aid in the execution of the trust and is therefore inap-
plicable."1
Even though the trustees of a charitable testamentary trust have
wide discretion, the alleged trust beneficiaries do have standing to bring
suit to question the action of the trustees.8 2
IV. SUCCESSION
A. Formal Requisites
1. ATTESTATION AND SIGNING
In In re Estate of Watson,"' a will was signed by the decedent in
a gasoline station and witnessed by the station operator and another
customer. Each witness signed in the other's and the decedent's pres-
ence. The attestation and signing was testified to by the station operator
alone. This was held to be sufficient evidence to satisfy section 731.0784
and section 732.315 of the Florida Statutes (1969) and to admit the
will to probate.
Under Section 732.31 of the Florida Statutes (1969),6 the burden
of proof as to execution and attestation is placed on the proponent of
the will in the first instance. However, it can be waived by the conduct
court will authorize the substitution of another reasonably approximate scheme to carry out
the testator's general purpose. See A. SrimEs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 130 (2d ed. 1966).
80. 226 So.2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
81. Id. at 416.
82. Barker v. The Board of Education of the Florida Annual Conference of the Methodist
Church, 245 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See note 70 supra and the related textual
discussion.
83. 226 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
84. "The testator, in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses present at the same
time, must sign his will . . ." FLA. STAT. § 731.07(2) (1969).
85. In all proceedings . . the burden of proof, in the first instance, shall be upon
the proponent thereof to establish, prima facie, the formal execution and attestation
thereof ....
FLA. STAT. § 732.31 (1969).
86. See note 85 supra.
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and statements of the contestant in not placing the formal execution and
attestation of the will in issue at all.
The Disrict Court of Appeal, Third District, stated in Talmudical
Academy v. Harris88 that although a written promise to make a bequest
was executed in Maryland, and though the decedent died in Florida
without completing the bequest, the court must still apply section 731.051
of the Florida Statutes (1969) which requires the person to be charged
to sign in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. Since this was not
done, the petition was denied. The ratio decidendi of the case was that
the statute is procedural in nature, is part of the probate laws, deals
with enforceability rather than validity, and thus is part of the public
policy of the state and not subject to the normal rule that the validity
of a contract is determined under the law of the place where it is made. a9
2. COMPETENCY
Normally there is a presumption of a lack of testamentary capacity
if a will is executed during an insane delusion or executed by a person
adjudged incompetent. However, in three cases dealing with competency
of the testator, the Florida courts upheld wills executed with these al-
leged defects in issue. This would seem to indicate a great desire to
leave the final decision to the discretion of the trier of fact.
First, in In re Estate of Supplee,90 a 79-year-old testatrix, adjudi-
cated incompetent due to a chronic brain syndrome, changed her will
because she believed the petitioner stole certain articles from her home.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, upheld the changed will
against the petitioner's claim that the testatrix was suffering from an
insane delusion because the presumption of lack of testamentary capa-
city by an adjudged incompetent had been overcome by proof showing
the will was executed during a lucid interval. "As this court under-
stands the law relative to insane delusions, it is not the truth or falsity
of the 'belief' but, instead, whether or not such belief arose from rea-
soning from a known premise." 91
In the second case, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
upheld a will in favor of non-blood relatives which had been executed
by a testatrix who was a drug addict and who had been declared men-
tally incompetent. The will had been made five and one-half months
before her death and was neither explained nor read to her, and her
physician, who examined her two days before execution of the will,
testified that she was not competent. 2 The Fourth District felt the trial
court had enough evidence to reasonably conclude that the testatrix
87. In re Estate of Rap&, 243 So.2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
88. 238 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
89. Id. at 162.
90. 247 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
91. Id. at 491.
92. In re Estate of Whitehead, 248 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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had testamentary capacity and that the will was not a product of undue
influence, but rather motivated by acts of kindness on the part of the
major beneficiaries.
Finally, in Moses v. Rainey,"5 the District Court of Appeal, Sec-
ond District, upheld a will where the testatrix left the bulk of her
estate to strangers because she thought that her sister had taken control
of her pension fund. The sister unsuccessfully alleged that the testatrix
was under an insane delusion, mentally incompetent, and that no such
pension fund ever existed. However, Acting Chief Judge Pierce, in ex-
plaining his decision to uphold the will, clearly reaffirmed the great
discretion which is left to the trier of fact when he stated:
The case poses to this court a most delicate, as well as a most
closely balanced, issue as to the testatrix's testamentary capac-
ity, one which we would probably feel impelled to affirm, which-
ever way the trial Judge had ruled. Maybe if we had been the
triers of fact we would have held to the contrary. But we can-
not say, as a matter of law, that on this record the eminent trial
Judge was clearly in error in his finding. 4
3. UNDUE INFLUENCE
a. Attorney as Beneficiary
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held in In re Estate
of Nelson95 that the defendant attorneys, named as trustees, were bene-
ficiaries of the estate even though not named in the will as iegatees
or devisees. However, there was sufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of undue influence which normally arises when one is in a
confidential relationship with the decedent. Here, the decedent had be-
queathed a major portion of his estate to a trust with the defendant
attorneys who drew up the documents as trustees with unlimited dis-
cretion to distribute the income or corpus for religious, educational,
scientific, charitable, or literary purposes as they should see fit. The
defendant attorneys were also named executors and had sole authority
to fix fees for themselves and their law firm, subject to court approval.
While the First District did not find undue influence in this case, Judge
Wigginton did state that the provision of the will conferred real and
substantial tangible or intangible benefits over and above compensation
and that the trial court's finding was "clothed with a presumption of
correctness." 96
In In re Estate of Rapj,97 the principle beneficiary was the testa-
93. 241 So.2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
94. Id. at 444.
95. 232 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
96. Id. at 224. This case should serve as a warning to attorneys named as trustees who
think they may never be considered beneficiaries and accused of undue influence.
97. 243 So.2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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trix's attorney who was having an illicit love affair with her. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that while this circumstance
gave rise to a presumption of undue influence, the presumption was
not evidence and had only procedural consequences. Here the presump-
tion was effectively rebutted, and the will was upheld. 8
b. Others as Beneficiary
In In re Estate of Dalton,99 relatives of the testatrix raised the
issue of undue influence by a third party upon the testatrix. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, held as a matter of law that it
would not disturb the county judge's findings that there had been no
presumption of undue influence raised. The court added that even if a
presumption of undue influence should have been raised, that it would
easily have been overcome by the clear and convincing evidence which
appeared on the record from the lower court.
Perhaps the most significant case decided in the last two years in
Florida dealing with undue influence and the role presumptions play is
In re Estate of Carpenter.00 Here, the daughter, the will proponent,
had her mother, the testatrix, hospitalized. The daughter then called
her own attorney to the hospital to draw her mother's will naming the
daughter as sole beneficiary to the exclusion of her three brothers. The
attorney questioned the testatrix in private to determine her true in-
tent. He then arranged for two witnesses (one a doctor) and executed
the will in the hospital. Later, the will was explained again to the
testatrix. The probate court held that the will was void due to the pre-
sumption of undue influence arising from the sole beneficiary actively
procurring the will via a confidential relationship. The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the finding of the probate court,
holding that the testimony of the attorney, who drafted the will and
witnessed its execution, that it was in accord with wishes of the testatrix
who had acted freely and voluntarily was sufficient to erase the pre-
sumption of undue influence by the sole beneficiary.
Judge Owen, speaking for the Fourth District in Carpenter, discus-
sed at length the concept of undue influence and the role of presump-
tions. Regarding undue influence, he stated that it is "conduct which
must amount to overpersuasion, duress, force, coercion, or artful or
98. The court cited In re Estate of Carpenter, 239 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), dis-
cussed fully in the next section of this survey. See notes 100-04 infra and the related textual
discussion.
99. 246 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
100. 239 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Subsequent to the period embraced by this
survey, the Supreme Court of Florida decided this case on conflict certiorari. In re Carpenter,
253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971). This case substantially affirmed the major holding of the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, but modified that opinion in other respects. The case is
probably one of the most significant cases handed down in recent years dealing with the
shifting presumptions of proof in will contests when undue influence is raised. See Note, 26
U. Mu.i L. REv. 283 (1971) infra.
TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
fraudulent contrivances to such a degree that there is destruction of
the free agency and will power of the one making the will." '' In deal-
ing with undue influence direct proof is not always available, leaving
one to reply upon circumstantial evidence or a presumption. 0 2 Regard-
ing the proper function of the presumption in this area, Judge Owen
stated what has now become a frequently repeated quotation:
It is a rule of law which attaches to certain evidentiary facts
and is productive of certain procedural consequences .... The
procedural consequence of the presumption is simply that in
the absence of credible evidence contradicting the presumed
fact, the court determines as a matter of law that the presumed
fact is true.
It should be emphasized, however, that a presumption is
not itself evidence and has no probative value.'
Judge Reed dissented in Carpenter on the ground that the appellate
court had improperly acted as a trial court. °4
4. CONTRACTS TO MAKE A WILL
In Talmudical Academy v. Harris,'° the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, did not uphold a contract made in Maryland for a
charitable bequest by a decedent who died in Florida since the contract
did not conform to section 731.051 of the Florida Statutes (1969).106
5. REVOCATION
In In re Estate of Bancker,0 7 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held invalid the attempted revocation of a will which was torn
into pieces and flushed down a toilet at the testator's request. While
the instrument was indisputably destroyed, it was not destroyed in the
presence of the testator, and the revocation was thus ineffective pur-
suant to the requisites set down in Florida Statutes section 731.14(1)
(1969).108 "[S]trict compliance with the statutory requirements is a
prerequisite for the valid creation or revocation of a will."' 0 9 In addi-
101. Id. at 508.
102. Id. at 509.
103. Id.
104. In reaching this conclusion the majority has, in my opinion, substituted its
judgment for that of the trial judge with respect to the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be accorded their testimony. This is not a proper function of the
appellate court.
Id. at 510 (dissenting opinion).
105. 238 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
106. See notes 88 and 89 supra and the related textual discussion therein for a detailed
analysis of this case.
107. 232 So.2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
108. "A will may be revoked by the testator himself or by some other person in his
presence and by his direction . . ." FLA. STAT. § 731.14(1) (1969).
109. In re Estate of Bancker, 232 So.2d 431, 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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tion, the court allowed the wife to reestablish the destroyed will by the
testimony of disinterested witnesses as provided by section 732.27(3)
of the Florida Statutes (1967).
B. Interests Arising out of the Marital Tie
1. DOWER
In a case of first impression,"' the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, denied a widow dower rights to real property located
in Michigan which was conveyed while she was still married but with-
out her relinquishment of dower rights on the theory that dower is a
creature of statute"' and determined by the law of the situs of the
property and not the law of the domicile of the parties. Thus, Michigan
statutes which give no dower right to a non-resident wife of lands con-
veyed by her husband during coverture were held to control."2
In Libberton v. Libberton,18 a wife wished to prevent her husband
from dissipating all the personalty he received as a result of a separa-
tion agreement. Therefore, she sought immediately the present value
of her inchoate dower rights. The court denied the wife's attempt since
her dower rights to personalty under section 731.34 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1969) attached only to personal property which the husband pos-
sessed at the time of his death. "A wife's inchoate right of dower in
her husband's personalty is on the same footing with the expectancy of
an heir before his decedent's death.""1
4
In In re Estate of Herron,"' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that the proceeds of a life insurance policy in an inter
vivos trust with a pour-over will were not subject to dower."'
2. HOMESTEAD
The rule that "homestead property can be alienated by a bona fide
transaction based upon valuable consideration" was applied in Morgan
v. Riley." 7 In Morgan, the conveyance of homestead property by a
husband to his wife was upheld since the wife was able to show her
independent contribution toward the purchase price.
Property which is not homestead is capable of being devised by
will. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in In re Estate of
Wilder,"8 allowed a grandmother to devise certain real property even
though her grandson alleged that she was the head of the household,
110. In re Estate of Johnson, 240 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
111. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1969).
112. In re Estate of Johnson, 240 So.2d 840, 843 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
113. 240 So.2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
114. Id. at 339.
115. 237 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
116. See note 46 supra and the related textual discussion of this case in detail.
117. 239 So.2d 524, 527 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
118. 240 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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thus making the property homestead and incapable of being devised. The
court rejected the grandson's contention and held that the grandmother
was not the head of a household pursuant to section 731.05(1) of the
Florida Statutes (1969) for purposes of homestead exemption. 9 Since the
grandson and his wife were both gainfully employed and since the
grandson considered himself the head of his own family, the court held
that no legal duty of support attached to the grandmother and that conse-
quently the property should not be characterized as homestead.
A husband divorced his first wife, remarried, and conveyed home-
stead property to himself and his second wife as a tenancy by the en-
tirety under section 4(c) of article X of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
Prior to the conveyance, the first wife had obtained a judgment for
unpaid alimony. Subsequent to the conveyance, the husband died. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Bendl v. Bendl.20 held that
the first wife had an undivided one-half interest along with the second
wife's undivided one-half interest in the homestead. However, it was
held that the first wife could not impress a lien on the second wife's
interest because the second wife took by right of survivorship under a
tenancy by the entirety, and therefore, her interest could not be used
to satisfy the debts of her deceased husband. It is important to note,
however, that this immunity did not come from the homestead exemption.
In a per curiam opinion, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, in Benvenuti v. Benvenuti,'21 upheld the trial court's finding of
the location of decedent's constitutional homestead at the time of death.
3. JOINT TENANCY
Where land was deeded specifically to the mother and daughter as
joint tenants with right of survivorship pursuant to section 689.15 of
the Florida Statutes (1969), and the mother later remarried and then
died intestate, the daughter was granted entire title as against the
mother's second husband in the case of La Pierre v. Kalergis.12
C. Construction and Testamentary Intent
In re Estate of Wood,'23 a case of first impression in Florida, in-
volved a latent ambiguity between the actual wording of certain para-
graphs and the general intent of the will as a whole. In Wood, a husband
and wife executed similar wills with the same common disaster para-
graph which left their estates to each other's named relatives on a 50-50
119. FLA. STAT. § 731.05(1) (1969) provides:
[Wihenever a person who is head of a family, residing in this state and having a
homestead therein, dies and leaves either a widow or lineal descendents or both
surviving him, the homestead shall not be the subject of devise, but shall descend as
otherwise provided in this law for the descent of homesteads.
120. 246 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
121. 227 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
122. 251 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
123. 226 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Wood].
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basis. The problem arose because the wife's will did not make any pro-
vision for her estate where the spouses did not die in a common disaster.
In fact, there never was a common disaster, and the husband prede-
ceased his wife. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, however,
found that the devisees took under the common disaster clause because
a latent ambiguity existed, and parol or extrinsic evidence was admis-
sible to show the actual intent of the testator. This case demonstrates
the rule that when the testator's actual intent becomes clear and con-
vincing, "the courts may construe a will as if words were inserted therein
when such words were omitted solely by inadvertence or oversight and
are essential to the expression of the testator's manifest intention."' 24
Chief Judge Hobson, in discussing will construction and testamentary
intent, went on to state what has become perhaps the most quoted rule
in this area of Florida law today:
The learned county judge entered his findings and opinion as
follows, with which we agree and adopt as part of this opinion:
This Court is inclined to follow the law as set down by the
Honorable Judge Wigginton, In re Parker's Estate, 110 So.2d
498, and the numerous cases cited therein in which it was stated
"It is uniformly held in this jurisdiction that in construing last
Wills and Testaments the polar star by which the Court is
guided is the intent of the testator as ascertained by a con-
sideration of the entire instrument, and not some isolated seg-
ment thereof.' 1 2
Where the testatrix who had no grandchildren used the word "grand-
children" in a will, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held
that this language constituted a latent ambiguity. Thus, extrinsic evi-
dence was admissible to show that the persons to whom the testatrix
made reference were the children of the son of her first husband by a
former marriage.126
A residuary clause provided for four named children of a testator's
nephew who were living at the time the will was executed. After the
execution of the will, a fifth child was born. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, in In re Trust of Hennes 27 held the disposition
to be to a class rather than to the four named children. Therefore, the
court allowed the fifth child to share equally in the proceeds. "Thus,
we somewhat baldly, having only the words of the will before us, reach
out for the testator's intention, such being the pole star of will con-
struction efforts."' 28
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added).
126. Scheurer v. Tomberling, 240 $o.2d 172 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
127. 240 So.2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
128. Id. at 860 (footnote omitted). See note 125 supra and the related quoted material
in the text.
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An example of how far courts will go to uphold what is believed
to be the testator's intent is illustrated in Auten v. Conway. 29 In that
case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, allowed a handwrit-
ten memorandum using precatory words to be admitted to probate over
the testatrix's prior formal will.
In Jenkins v. Donahoo,8 ° the Supreme Court of Florida settled
the question of the effect of later statutory changes on previously ex-
ecuted wills. The case involved the Uniform Principal and Income Law
of Florida 1' and a testamentary mutual investment trust directing the
"determination of income and principal ... in accordance with the in-
come and principal statutes of the State of Florida."'3 Eight months
after the testatrix died, the act was amended, making the distribution
of capital deemed principal and not income, irrespective of the choice
of the trustee.88 The trustees brought a declaratory judgment action
since the law in effect at the time of the will's execution required the
allocation of dividends to income. The Supreme Court of Florida held
that absent language to the contrary, the "presumption is that the testa-
trix intended reference to those statutes as they existed at the time the
will was executed,"'8 4 again stating the polar star is the intent of the
testator."' Regarding the effect of statutory changes, Justice Boyd fur-
ther stated:
The right of trust beneficiaries to benefits in accord with the
testator's lawful direction is basic. Only changes in the statu-
tory laws not affecting substantial rights and not contrary to
the expressed intent of the testator may be applied retroac-
tively.8 6
When a will is subject to two interpretations, one which makes it
an illegal perpetuity and the other which makes it valid and operative,
the courts will adopt the latter. 7
In Guilliams v. The First National Bank, 8" the language in the will
evidenced an intent to impose a condition precedent, rather than a con-
dition subsequent, to the vesting of title in the remaindermen benefici-
aries. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that title did
129. 240 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
130. 231 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1970).
131. FLA. STAT. ch. 690 (1969).
132. Jenkins v. Donahoo, 231 So.2d 809, 810 (Fla. 1970).
133. "[Plrovided however, that all distributions of capital of mutual investment trusts
shall be deemed principal irrespective of the choice made by the trustee." FLA. STAT.
§ 690.06(1) (1969).
134. Jenkins v. Donahoo, 231 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1970).
135. Id. See note 125 supra and the related quoted material in the text.
136. Jenkins v. Donahoo, 231 So.2d 809, 812 (Fla. 1970).
137. In re Estate of Stewart, 242 So.2d 781 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). But see notes 79-81
supra and the related textual discussion, where the court declined to apply the cy pres
doctrine.
138. 229 So.2d 633 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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not vest in the remainderman who failed to fulfill the condition prece-
dent; namely, the payment of taxes, utilities, repairs, and insurance on
the estate while the holder of the life estate was alive. The mere inability
of the potential devisees to perform a condition precedent did not relieve
them of the duty to perform. 189
A provision in a will devised certain property to the testator's adult
son, and a residuary clause provided that in the event of the son's death,
the trustee was to distribute the income from the estate not otherwise
disposed of by prior provisions of the will to the son's wife and two chil-
dren. By examining the entire will and omissions in other clauses, it was
found that the residuary clause related only to the portion the son would
have been entitled to had he lived. 4 °
"[T]he Florida Probate Law uses the term 'survivor' to mean the
survivor or last living of a designated group rather than the heirs at law
of a deceased member of that group."'' Thus, Florida gives this term
its literal and common meaning.
In In re Estate of Freedman,'42 a child of the testator was speci-
fically mentioned in previous wills which stated that there would be no
provision for her. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that the petitioner was not a pretermitted child under section 731.11 of
the Florida Statutes (1969). The petitioner had changed her name, and
there had been later codicils republished after the name change. In addi-
tion, the court held that under section 731.17 of the Florida Statutes
(1969), a codicil sufficiently republishes the will if its only reference is
to the will itself without reference to the date of the prior will.148
D. Jurisdiction
In First National Bank v. Moon, 44 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, clarified the $100 jurisdictional limit for county judge's
courts under section 36.01 (1) of the Florida Statutes (1969). After prop-
erty is transferred to the beneficiary and he brings a devastavit action 45
claiming in excess of $100, the circuit court or court of record has proper
jurisdiction even if some other portion of the estate is still pending ad-
ministration. However, it is important to note that the beneficiary must
be bringing the action for his own individual recovery for section 36.01
(1) to apply. If he brings the devastavit action for the estate, then juris-
diction remains in the county judge's court pursuant to its exclusive right
to handle probate matters regardless of the amount involved. 6
An order from the county judge's court where the court reserves
139. Id. at 635.
140. In re Trust of Carmichael, 227 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
141. In re Estate of Gallop, 248 So.2d 686, 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
142. 226 So.2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
143. Id. at 427.
144. 234 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
145. FLA. STAT. § 733.53 (1969).
146. First Nat'l Bank v. Moon, 234 So.2d 402, 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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jurisdiction is interlocutory in character and not appealable to the district
court of appeal until the order becomes final. 47 Alternatively, a probate
judge does not have any jurisdiction to entertain a petition for rehearing
after he has entered a final order. 14 8
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in In re Estate of Ray-
mond, 49 held that the county judge's court has jurisdiction to determine
the status of property in question when the heirs allege it is homestead
and exempt against the claims of a creditor. "[T]he county judge does
have jurisdiction to make a finding, for administrative purposes, of what
assets belong to the estate."'50
When petitioners, after three years of litigation in the county judge's
court, first raised the question of domicile, they were held to have waived
the right to challenge the fact of domicile on equitable grounds as dis-
tinguished from the general power of the court to adjudicate the class of
cases to which the subject matter of the pending case belonged. 5'
E. Probate and Administration
1. LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS AND THEIR PAYMENT
Numerous cases arose under section 733.16 of the Florida Statutes
(1969),152 the so-called non-claim statute, and under section 733.18 of
the Florida Statutes (1969) regarding payment of claims and objections
thereto.
"The power of a personal representative derives from a legislative
grant. It should be exercised strictly in accord with the prescriptions laid
down by the granting authority."' 53 For this reason, the Supreme Court
of Florida, in Twomey v. Clausohm,"'4 reversed the District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, 55 and disallowed the payment of certain claims
by the personal representative. The claims had not been filed in compli-
ance with section 733.16 of the Florida Statutes (1969) which generally
requires the filing of all claims against the estate within six months of
the first publication of notice to creditors.
In Goldberg v. Michalik,'56 where the plaintiff was also the ad-
ministratrix, the filing of her claim was held to be within the six month
period prescribed by section 733.16 of the Florida Statutes (1969). The
publication of first notice to creditors could not occur before letters of
147. In re Estate of Herlan, 239 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). But see note 164 infra
and the related textual quotation.
148. In re Estate of Armistead, 240 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
149. 246 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
150. In re Estate of Herron, 237 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (emphasis supplied
by court).
151. In re Estate of Dalton, 246 So.2d 612, 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
152. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-32, adding FLA. STAT. § 733.16(1)(e), exemption to this
statute. See note 36 supra and the related textual discussion of this change.
153. Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1970).
154. Id.
155. Clausohm v. Twomey, 226 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
156. 237 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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administration were issued under section 733.15 of the Florida Statutes
(1969). In addition, there was no service of process problem since the
plaintiff was serving herself.
In Stanton v. Kruse,"5 7 the plaintiff was aware of decedent's death
and had actual notice of the publication of notice to creditors. At the
request of the attorney representing the estate, the plaintiff did not file
suit within the requisite six months. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that this was not sufficient cause to extend the six month
time requirement of the non-claim statute.
The Supreme Court of Florida in In re Estate of Sale, 58 held that
section 733.18 of the Florida Statutes (1969) regarding payment of and
objections to claims merely operates as a rule of judicial procedure and
not as a non-claim statute. Thus, the two month time requirement for
filing objections can be relaxed in the sound discretion of the trial judge
for "good cause" shown. 59 But the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, denied an extension to the two month requirement of section 733.18
(2) where the claimant had knowledge of the timely objection to his
claim, but refused to answer the objection because he believed his claim
to be just.6 0 The court indicated that good cause had not been shown
since nothing the administrator did could have lulled the claimant into a
false sense of security regarding his claim.
2. FLORIDA RULES OF PROBATE AND GUARDIANSHIP PROCEDURE
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, upheld the withhold-
ing of sufficient funds to pay for expenses arising from a re-accounting
which it had previously ordered. 6' As a result of that withholding, the
amount ultimately paid out was less than the amount ordered to be paid
out as a result of the re-accounting. The court relied upon rule 5.430(d)
of the Probate and Guardianship Rules for its rationale.'6 2
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in In re Estate of
157. 229 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). See also Grayson v. Maeder, 247 So.2d 774
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) [this case previously before the Florida courts in Grayson v. Maeder,
227 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969)]; Domnick v. Ware, 240 So.2d 654 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970);
Maeder v. Grayson, 222 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Grayson v. Maeder, 186 So.2d 796
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
158. 227 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1969).
159. The creditor or claimant shall thereupon be limited to two calendar months from
the date of such service within which to bring appropriate suit, action or proceedings
upon such claim or demand. The county judge for good cause shown may extend the
time for filing objection to any claim or demand or the time for serving such
objection, and may likewise for good cause shown extend the time for filing
appropriate suit, action, or proceedings upon any such claim after objection is
filed ....
FLA. STAT. § 733.18(2) (1969).
160. First Bank and Trust Co. v. Bush, 226 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
161. Methodist Episcopal Church v. Richardson, 244 So. 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
162. The personal representative may, before making distribution, retain from the
funds in his hands a sufficient amount to pay the expenses accrued since the filing
of his final report and his application for discharge.
FLA. R. PROB. & GUARD. 5.430(d).
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Falk,6 ' required the answers to fourteen certified questions posed by
the caveators. The court held that the answers sought were relevant to
the claims and could be provided with little or no additional expense to
either party. The rationale was found in rules 5.080 and 5.150 of the
Probate and Guardianship Rules.
"An order fixing attorney's fees in a probate proceeding is 'final' in
the sense that it is an appealable order although it may not be the last
such order in an estate.M 64
3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in In re Estate of Ray-
mond,"'65 held that the fact that a creditor's claim is unliquidated and
arises out of an automobile accident is not a reason to deny the appoint-
ment of an administrator for the estate as failure to do so would keep
the claim from ever becoming liquid.
In In re Estate of Maxcy,16 the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that two or more attorneys for co-executors may not receive
in the aggregate more in fees than one attorney would have received for
performing the required legal services for the estate. In so holding, the
court stated that a number of attorneys representing one or multiple co-
executors and being paid out of estate funds is generally not permissible.167
A decedent died intestate, the appointed administrator contacted the
only living relative he could find, checked a safe deposit box and found
no will, and made distribution two years after death. The administrator
was not held personally liable when sons of the decedent came forward four
years after his death although they knew of the decedent's death some
time prior to coming forward. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, in so holding, announced the standard of care required of an
administrator:
[T]he County Judge entered order . . . finding that "the ad-
ministrator ... exercised the diligence that an ordinary prudent
man would exercise under like circumstances. Although hind-
sight would tend to show that the administrator acted incau-
tiously, if his acts, as proven, are examined in sequence, it
appears that he performed naturally and sufficiently prudently
as to not constitute negligence."' 6
In Stephan v. Brown,' the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that after one buys real estate from an executrix and accepts
163. 247 So.2d 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
164. In re Estate of Cook, 245 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing FLA. R. PROB.
& GUARD. Rule 5.100.
165. 237 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
166. 240 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
167. Id. at 95.
168. In re Estate of Pennington, 226 So.2d 881, 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
169. 233 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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the executrix's deed, there is a merger of the contract for sale and the
executrix's deed, and the latter controls on warranties. The rationale is
that the executrix can only convey what the decedent had. Thus, even
though the contract provided for sale free and clear of encumbrances,
there were in fact encumbrances, and the executrix's deed contained no
warranty against them.
Under section 732.44(3) of the Florida Statutes (1969), brothers
and half-sisters are of the same degree. Therefore, letters of administra-
tion shall be granted to the one selected in writing by the majority of
them even if the brother is not notified. 170
4. ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in In re Estate of
Jackson,171 refused to allow the revocation of the probate court's order
of final discharge even where the testator's minor son, who had neither
actual nor constructive notice of probate, filed for revocation one day
after the order of final discharge was entered. The court strictly con-
strued section 732.30(1) of the Florida Statutes (1969), which permits
an heir not served with notice of probate nor barred under section
732.29 of the Florida Statutes (1969), "to petition for revocation of
probate at anytime before final discharge of the personal representa-
tive."'1 72 This language was held to prohibit filing after discharge.
In The First National Bank v. Cooper,7s the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that the administrator's motion for leave
to file a third-party complaint against the widow should have been
granted to decide a creditor's lien on an estate since the administrator
had to pay the decedent's debt. Since in this instance the widow's possible
liability for the debt was in question, the court found the administrator's
motion to be proper.
Procedurally, failure to attach copies of the wills, codicils, and trust
agreements to the record on appeal when suing executors and trustees to
determine their duties will guarantee a lost case for the plaintiffs on the
grounds of failure to establish an adequate record on appeal.' 7'
Where the executrix did not raise the affirmative defense of payment
of a note from decedent to plaintiff four days prior to decedent's death,
there would be no presumption of payment by the decedent.175
Failure to allege ultimate facts to establish a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, coupled with a vague and indefinite complaint re-
170. In re Estate of Carty, 227 So.2d 894 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
171. 236 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
172. Id. at 476 (emphasis supplied by court).
173. 234 So.2d 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
174. Jones v. The First Nat'l Bank, 226 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
175. Pollack v. Meyer, 242 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); accord, Windle v. Sebold,
241 So.2d 165 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (held error to strike affirmative defense of satisfaction
of mortgage alleged by personal representative).
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garding the amount of assets, the time they were received, or the circum-
stances surrounding their receipt, resulted in a dismissal with prejudice
of an alleged action for mismanagement of an estate in Maiden v. Car-
ter.
1 7 6
In Bodne v. Ferrell,177 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
upheld a substantial award of attorney's fees against an estate. The
granting of such fees was found to be within the trial judge's discretion
and to be supported by expert testimony.
F. Inter Vivos Gift
In Wood v. McClellan,78 a daughter and her father had intended to
set up a joint savings account by transferring funds from the father's
account into the joint account. All of the signature cards were filled out
for the joint account, but the daughter ordered the bank not to make
the transfer until a certain date in order to earn a higher interest pay-
ment. Six days prior to the appointed date the father died. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that there had been no inter vivos
gift of the funds to the daughter and that the funds from the father's
account properly belonged to his estate. The rationale given by the court
was that there was no intent to deliver the funds until the interest was
earned and paid and that there was no acceptance of the funds until after
the decedent's death. Judge Rawls went on to explain:
When a claim of a gift is not asserted until after the death of
the alleged donor, the donee must show by clear and satisfac-
tory evidence every element which is requisite to constitute a
gift. [Citations omitted] ... The elements include donative in-
tent, delivery-either actual, constructive or symbolic- an ac-
ceptance by the donee.'
In McDonough v. Rudisill,8 ° the District Court of Appeal, the Sec-
ond District, upheld as a completed inter vivos gift the delivery of stock
certificates by the decedent to his niece and nephew even though they
delivered the certificates back to their uncle, and he sold them with their
authority. He also made no accounting to them prior to his death, but
this also was not held to invalidate the gift.
The registering of stock certificates in joint tenancy creates only a
rebuttable presumption of an inter vivos gift. In Sullivan v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 181 the decedent purchased stock and
registered it in joint tenancy with her son, but maintained possession,
received all dividends for her personal expenses, and her son never saw
176. 234 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
177. 233 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
178. 247 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
179. Id. at 78.
180. 229 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
181. 230 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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the certificates. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
there was a lack of present donative intent, thus invalidating the gift,
and that the stock belonged to the estate.
G. The Rule Against Perpetuities82
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a special
power of appointment given to an attorney to make distribution of a
testamentary trust upon the death of a life tenant was not violative of
the Rule Against Perpetuities.88 Even if the named attorney died before
the life tenant, without exercising the power of appointment, the trust
residue would have passed by intestacy at the death of the life tenant.
The court indicated that the words, "if at all,"'" 4 in the Rule Against
Perpetuities were the lifegiving words of the rule since, in the instant
case, there would be vesting by intestacy."8 5
V. ADDENDUM-EFFECT OF NEw FLORIDA
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The present Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were amended by the
Supreme Court of Florida and took effect after 12:01 a.m. December 13,
1971.186
Newly added Rule 1.110(h), which covers subsequent pleadings
under the general rules of pleading, was added to cover a subject usually
arising under trust supervision. "It is intended to establish the same
method of pleading for subsequent proceedings as is applicable to the
original proceeding."' 8 7
New Rule 1.627, which covers trust accounting, "incorporates the
provisions of Section 737.03, 737.04 and 737.09 through 737.16 Florida
Statutes and adds additional provisions about the method of examining
or auditing accounts."' 88 The remaining provisions of chapter 737 of the
Florida Statutes (1969) are unaffected since they are considered sub-
stantive in nature. This rule is extensive in nature and scope and too long
to be covered in this survey.
Additionally, form 1.950 entitled "Trust Qualification Petition" was
added. 89
182. The best statement of this rule is that which tracks the language of John Chipman
Gray and is as follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." A. Sus, HAND-
BOOK OF TnE LAW OF FuruRE INTERESTS § 127 (2d ed. 1966).
183. In re Estate of Stewart, 242 So.2d 781 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
184. Id. at 784. See note 182 supra.
185. Id.
186. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 253 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1971). Even though
these amendments to the rules were promulgated after the period covered by this survey,
they will be discussed in a limited manner because they add two new rules and one new
form affecting trusts.
187. Id. at 406 (Committee Note, 1971 Amendment to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h)).
188. Id. at 413 (Committee Note, adopted 1971, to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.627).
189. Id. at 413-14.
